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Abstract
On the arrival of the new banking law in Morocco, in august 2015, conventional banks and
their foreign rivals will finally have the possibility to create their subsidiaries dedicated to micro-
credit, participative finance and payment, and hence, supply the market with new Islamic financial
solutions for money saving and financing. In order to drain the substantial households savings
escaping to classic banks, and consequently, gain ground among these latter, we think that those
new Islamic finance operators should target, in almost equal proportions, people with no access to
formal financing and those with religious convictions about interest rate prohibition in Islam. For
this purpose, we conceptualized an innovative bank based model of Rotating Savings and Credit
Associations that allows its members to invest their savings by means of the bank, and raise free-
interest rate loans with no application and management fees. In fact, The conception of this model
relied on the results of a survey questionnaire we administered among 725 subjects from different
social categories in Morocco to comprehend the inherent features of this informal practice (RoSCA)
locally called "Daret". The first part of the answers gave us a basic data we used, by means of
the two-way ANOVA (Analysis of the variance), to determine which social characteristics interact
together to motivate a person to join a RoSCA. As for the second part of the answers, it gave us
insights into the functioning of traditional RoSCAs in Morocco and their members preferences and
perceptions on different scales. After all, we based on these findings to conceptualize the model
taking into account both equity between members and sustainability of the operation. Additionally,
unlike the traditional types of RoSCAs that rely on confidence and social links between members,
this bank-based investing RoSCA allows people with no prior cognition to be gathered. This by
introducing the bank as a guarantor and withdrawing, temporarily, a deposit for default risk to
estimate by means of a risk-rating matrix we proposed. The model is, also, found to be more
attractive regarding its real economy promotion through investment, risk sharing process, and
integration of financially excluded households.
JEL-Classification: O16; O17; G32; G2.
Keywords: RoSCA; Two-way ANOVA; Islamic finance; Default risk; Morocco.
1 Introduction
Beyond the traditional saving and credit practices used locally in many developing countries, Rotat-
ing Savings and Credit Associations1 (henceforth, RoSCAs for short) had a very special attention from
various economists and sociologists who have been studying the historical, sociological and economic
aspects of these widely known informal financing alternatives. In fact, some authors went to the point
of modeling and analyzing the financial functioning and behavior of some very sophisticated types of
ROSCAs (Tchuindjo, 2000)(Yu, 2013). We refer here to bidding2 RoSCAs widespread in Asia, Latin
America and some southern African countries. In general, RoSCAs are often analyzed in the literature
of microfinance and collaborative finance.
The importance granted to these associations can be explained first, by their major role in the
financing of several informal sector activities in many African and Asian developing countries (Lelart,
1990)(Ardener and Burman, 1995)(Gasse-Hellio, 2000)(Umuhire, 2013)(Umuhire and Nyssens, 2013).
In fact, during the eighties, many developing countries were heavily indebted and faced inextricable
difficulties with the steady rise in interest rates. Populations of these countries felt the urgent need to
use domestic savings and find ways to mobilize it more effectively to finance their development on a
micro scale.
In addition, the national banking systems were often in crisis at this time regarding a reckless credit
policy. As a consequence, commercial banks lost the trust of their customers and were unable to collect
people’s savings and therefore finance agriculture, commerce and small businesses (Kedir et al., 2011).
And This is how we have witnessed the emergence of new financing informal practices at this period.
These informal practices represent an original behavior of the local populations and correspond to a
quite strange financial mechanisms that constitute what is now called “informal finance" (Lelart, 1999).
It is really difficult to have a clear idea of the extent of this phenomenon. This is because transactions
through these informal practices are not recorded and therefore, cannot be attributed to national
accounts. But we are certain that informal finance is important and very significant and we still
wonder about its role in relation to that of institutional finance (Goffe, 2014). It is also important
to know how to make the best possible use of the huge funds flowing in informal finance to meet the
needs of the emerging economies.
Morocco as a developing country does not make an exception compared to countries where informal
finance has existed for decades as a common practice in various forms (Abdaimi, 1989). The most used
forms we can cite here are : self financing through financial hoarding ; family financing or proximity
financing ; traditional-mortgage housing transactions3 and RoSCAs commonly called “Jamaaia/Daret".
1The term Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (RoSCA) as it was used for the first time by (Geertz, 1962)
refers to financial self-help groups that collect multiple contributions from their members across time, and allocate merged
funds called pots-back generally in rotation. ROSCAs are generally categorized by researchers into random, fixed, and
bidding RoSCAs (Ardener, 1964)(Yu, 2013). These informal financing institutions travel under many different names :
Chit funds in India, Susu in Ghana, Tontines in many francophone countries in west Africa, Cheetu in Sri Lanka, and
Daret in Morocco which means rotation in Arabic dialect. These are just few examples.
2In these associations, each participant contributes with regular intervals to a pool, an amount of money fixed in
advance. This fund is put on sale each time, according to a process of oral bidding, and the products drawn from this
auction are immediately put on sale according to the same process of bidding. These type is not used in Morocco because
of its interest-rate based remuneration prohibited by Islamic religion and partially, by Moroccan law.
3For more details see (Mansouri and Ziki, 2005).
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The use of these informal financial practices is mainly explained by the absence of customized
banking services to the needs of the poor and micro entrepreneurs. Despite the fact that the Moroccan
banking system is well positioned in terms of banking coverage compared to many African and Arab
countries4, the offered services still inadequate to the needs of a large majority of the population. The
World bank reported in 2014 that 41% of Moroccan adults have never used any formal financial product
or service. In an worldwide scale, over 2 billion adults are unbanked and some socioeconomic categories
(farmers, artisans, small traders...) with low incomes have simply no access to bank financing for lack
of reliable forms of collateral that could be used to assuage bank’s fears of non repayment. Expensive
bank charges associated with lack of competition as stated by (Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 2012) are
considerably another influencing factor.
To meet the needs of this population, in parallel with the surfacing of microfinance all around
the world, Morocco has initiated the first operations of micro-financing with the support of the NGO
"AMSED" (Association Marocaine de Solidarité et de Développement) in 1993. In the late 90s, with
the efforts of public authorities, international donors, NGOs and local banks, the micro-credit sector
has been consolidated5 and microfinance associations had strengthened their institutional and financial
capacities6.
Except the fact that the sector of microfinance was continuously growing in Morocco till 2007 (Otto
and Ashta, 2012), some serious problems have surfaced. The repayment rate dropped to 95% instead of
99% in 2007 and continued to fall (Reille, 2009). The second MFI in Morocco “Zakoura", experienced
serious management problems, which led to its absorption by the FBPMC (Fondation Banque Populaire
pour le Micro-Crédit) to avoid its bankruptcy. Additionally, a serious crisis of confidence has settled
in the sector.
We do not intend to go further into details concerning the problems of micro-finance in Morocco.
What to retain is that, some informal financing practices had existed for a long time and continue to run
as an efficient and durable financing alternative against micro-finance products for different reasons.
And one of these practices is mutual RoSCAs. As stated by many authors, „RoSCAs succeeded
where market failed in the development of suitable formal saving and credit mechanisms“(Kedir et al.,
2011) (Pitt and Khandker, 1998).
In this paper we analyze the economic role and performance of RoSCAs in Morocco as a major
informal financing source, and determine what social characteristics motivate the most a person to
join a RoSCA. Another contribution of this paper is the identification of the common key factors of
success of RoSCAs in Morocco and why this practice has resisted and still preferred for a good number
of social categories.
Last but not least, we aim to conceptualize a new formal type of mutual RoSCAs where equity7
4The banking penetration rate is estimated at 57% until 2014 and the coverage rate is about one banking agency for
6.000 residents.
5A National Microfinance Observatory was established as part of the partnership between the FNAM (Fédération
Nationale des Associations de Microcrédit) and the Mohammed VI Centre in support of solidary microfinance
6Towards the end of 2012, the twelve MFIs operating in Morocco were serving 810,712 customers for approximately
5 billion dirhams of loans, and four MFIs located in Morocco were in the Forbes ranking of the 50 Top Microfinance
Institutions in 2007.
7(Besley et al., 1992) studied the allocative performance of random and bidding RoSCAs and found that nether type
of RoSCA is efficient in terms of allocative performance and equity between members
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between contributors is ensured and the default risk is managed. We also take into account the
restriction of interest rates in Islamic religion and Moroccan law8 in the process of conceptualization.
Furthermore, the proposed model should be designed in a way that utility function of each member is
the same giving them similar opportunities and usefulness. A major challenging issue is also to make
the proposed model permissible for applicants with no prior cognition which is not met on the other
types of these savings and credit unions.
The structure of the remaining is as follow. The next section presents the materials and methods
used for the study. The third section outlines in its first subsection the survey questionnaire results
and describes the two-way ANOVA test results, while the second subsection exposes and discuss the
functioning of our proposed model and the related default risk rating method. The last section serves
to conclude and sets out future research directions with relation to this topic.
2 Materials and methods
As mentioned by many authors, RoSCAs can be considered as one of the the most ancient traditional
and informal financial institutions (Yakeen et al., 2014)(El-Gamal, 2015). They have contributed over
centuries to the development of various populations and helped people in several cases to climb social
ladders as found on the results. The success of this institutions is mainly attributed, inter alia, to
the efficient management of default risk based on proximity of contributors and application of group
pressure, furthermore, they are almost the lowest cost financing alternative compared to classic and
micro financing solutions. They require no collateral for applicants to join, the main guarantee here
is shared confidence. And most important, they are interest-free (Random and fixed RoSCAs in
particular).
Some questions that come to mind are, what if mutual RoSCAs were managed to bring together
people with similar contribution capabilities but who do not know each other? In other words, what if
proximity and social links between members were totally absent? this implies that confidence between
members should be urgently replaced by reliable guarantees. Another question is, what if these asso-
ciations were redesigned to provide more equity between members in terms of allocative performance
and utility? (Besley et al., 1992) is his first works on this question found that neither type of RoSCA
ensure equity by means of its functioning mechanism, especially for random RoSCAs were order is
determined by drawing of lots. a third question is about the possibility of making households savings
profitable. In other words, what if members of RoSCAs were able to invest during the cycle to make
profits. This is very motivating when we know that not all people join RoSCAs for a urgent financial
need and most of them prefer to take the pot in the last phase. At least there will be a mean to
compensate the depreciation of money in a context of hyperinflation for instance.
Finding ways to modernize and redesign RoSCAs to meet the aforementioned objectives aims to be
a real support of growth of this informal practices to compete and alternate classic financial products.
But before this, it was necessary to have a prior understanding of these unions and perceive their
members motivations, preferences and choices.
8The Moroccan code of obligations and contracts stipulates explicitly the prohibition of interest rates in a contract
concluded between two Muslims in its 870th article but still authorize it for moral persons and other religious groups.
See (Kettani, 2005) for more details.
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Economic theory has much to say about efficiency and performance of formal financial products,
but when it comes to formalize and modernize the informal ones, one should first study their inherent
aspects and characteristics so that their modernization enables them to gain ground among existing
financial saving tools and their derivatives.
Using a quantitative approach, by administering a survey questionnaire conducted among a targeted
sample with some specific economic and social status, the questionnaire was shaped so the answers of
the subjects give insights into features of RoSCAs in Morocco.
The size of the sample was revised upwards and its subjects were diversified at several times to be
statistically representative. A total number of 725 persons was investigated. At first, we administered
an online questionnaire among people with a minimum level of education from different social categories
(ranging from senior executives to students and housewives). We used professional social networks and
e-mail databases to reach our targeted subjects. In a second time, in order to diversify the sample
by including people with low incomes and no knowledge about using Information and Communication
Technologies, a field investigation was conducted where subjects had simply to give answers we noted.
3 Findings and discussion
3.1 The survey’s results
Considering the first part of the respondents answers, the table below gives an overview of the
survey’s sample demographics and socioeconomic data :
Table 1: Summary of Participants Demographics and Socioeconomic Data (part I)
Gender 50.4% Male 49.6% Female
Age
<20 20-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61 or more
(12%) (23.5%) (14.8%) (32.8%) (9.6%) (7.9%)
Marital status 56.3% Single 34.7% Married 4.1% Divorced 4.9% Widow(er)
Number of children in
charge*
1 child 2 children 3 children 4 children 5 or more
39.4% 24.2% 15.2% 7.6% 1.5%
Educational level
Primary Secondary University
14.3% 28.5% 57.2%
Employment status
Employed Job seekers Non working Retired
65.8% 16.5% 22.2% 4.5%
Salary frequency**
Monthly Bimonthly Weekly Daily
71.5 % 3.2% 5.1% 1.3%
Bank loan in repayment (25.9%) Yes (74.1 %) No
Amount of the monthly
payment (for the 25.9%
who said yes (in MAD))
<1000 1000-1999 2000-2999 3000-3999 4000-4999 5000 or more
12.5% 20.3 % 23.4% 15.6% 6.3% 21.9%
Currently/former member of a RoSCA 53.9% Yes 46.1% No
(*) Question answered by the 43.7% of the subjects being married, divorced or widow(er).
(**) Question addressed to the 65.8% of employed subjects.
Source: Authors own elaboration based on the survey’s results
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A first look at the table above highlights a significant concentration of the age of investigated subjects
around the age class of [41-50]. In fact, in order to test the existing correlations9 between having a
certain social status and being a current/former member of a RoSCA, we intentionally targeted this age
class supposed being stably employed and, additionally, having eventual past experiences with bank
loans. Another reason for selecting this category is related to the assumptions of two-way ANOVA
method used in this study, namely, distribution’s normality and heteroscedasticity.
The study of the associations was realized throughout a two-way ANOVA (Analysis of the variance)
test which has the advantage, in our case, to examine the influence of social characteristics on the
fact of being a current/former member of a RoSCA. Social characteristics represent the independent
categorical variables while the positive or negative answers to the question of being a current/former
member of a RoSCA represent the continuous dependent variable10.
The table below sums the F-test results for each combination of independent categorical variables
(factors of influence) :
Table 2: two-way ANOVA F-tests results
2nd factor 1st factor (MS: marital status ; NCC: number of children in charge ; EL: educational level ;ES: employment status ; BLR: bank loan in repayment)
NCC EL ES BLR
F Sig F Sig F Sig F Sig
MS
1st factor F(4,710)=56.31 .998 F(2,709)=12.29 .991 F(3,713)=0.80 .511 F(1,717)=6.00 .989
2nd factor F(3,710)=1.03 .603 F(3,709)=0.11 .050 F(3,713)=16.72 .990 F(3,717)=29.30 .999
Between F(12,710)=0.30 .015 F(6,709)=0.98 .568 F(9,713)=0.29 .024 F(3,717)=2.83 .961
NCC
1st factor F(2,710)=3.16 .960 F(3,705)=63.2 .979 F(1,715)=4.50 .976
2nd factor F(4,710)=18.60 .998 F(4,705)=49.10 .912 F(4,715)=15.80 .999
Between F(8,710)=0.22 .011 F(12,705)=0.41 .042 F(4,715)=0.16 .043
1st factor F(3,713)=22.10 .756 F(1,719)=3.47 .943
EL 2nd factor F(2,713)=16.10 .985 F(2,719)=2.45 .918
Between F(6,713)=8.09 .997 F(2,719)=0.19 .174
1st factor F(1,718)=0.45 .500
ES 2nd factor F(3,718)=3.12 .970
Between F(3,718)=0.09 .033
Notes : The F-stat reported are represented in the following form : F(1st factor degrees of freedom, 2nd factor degrees of freedom).
F-stat in bold are those statistically significant at 0.05 level of significance. Sig = probability of significance. In order to surpass
the problem of non homogeneity of variances (Heteroscedasticity), a Welch correction to the denominator degrees of freedom in the
F-test was used. The second assumption of observations independence is found to be insured. The table contains all combinations
of inter-variables F-tests. Note that the permutation of the IV has no effects on the tests results, in other words, taking a social
characteristic as a 1st factor or a 2nd factor will simply have no effect on the test results.
Source: Elaborated by authors based on Eviews and Excel output tables
Considering the first F-test results combining number of children in charge (NCC) and marital
status (MS) as independent categorical variables. It is shown that both social characteristics do
not have an influence on joining a RoSCA independently while their interaction do. This result11 was
initially anticipated. In fact, a good number of married and divorced respondents said that, sometimes,
9Some authors prefer the use of the word "association" instead of correlation for categorical data.
10Positive and negative answers were transformed to 0/1 binary variables for the needs of the F-test.
11Note that both categorical variables have more than 2 levels (5 levels for NCC and 4 levels for the MS). This allowed
us to perform a Tukey-Kramer Post-hoc tests in order to identify where means are significantly different from each
other, in other words, what levels are the most significant between all?. We mention here that Tukey-Kramer post-hoc
procedure was used regarding unequal samples sizes, and this, by using the harmonic mean instead (Tukey, 1949).
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joining a RoSCA is motivated by future education fees of their children for the next academic year
and even for the graduate studies. Exceptionally, some low incomes respondents we debriefed during
the investigations, mentioned that the collected pool served for buying children clothes in religious
celebration, namely, Eid al-Fitr.
In the same vein, the fourth test including educational level (EL) with number of children in
charge (NCC) proves that both factors interacted jointly to influence the participation of some survey’s
subjects to a RoSCA. Indeed, some of respondents having a certain degree of education admitted that
saving for future education fees of children (graduate studies) takes a part from their financial resources
as a contribution to a formal saving plan12 or, most importantly, a RoSCA.
The third F-test for both employment status (ES) and marital status (MS) demonstrates that the
interaction between both variables has a significant13 effect on being a current/former member of
a RoSCA. Furthermore, the table shows that for all tests including employment status (except for
ES/EL test) the F-stat of the variables interaction is statistically significant. This sustains the fact
that RoSCAs are largely used in professional contexts where proximity and mutual confidence are very
important between members.
Concerning educational level (EL), the results are very coherent, and the non-significant calculated
F-statistics shows that the factor has no influence on joining a RoSCA neither solely14 or in interaction
with other factors (except for the EL/NCC test detailed above). This asserts the fact that the practice
is widely known and practiced within most of social categories whatever their educational level is.
In fact, we found that this associations are created in different contexts where levels of studies are
widely divergent, a concrete example of this is the associations regrouping factory laborers and senior
executives in a socio-professional context.
The last test containing bank loan in repayment (BLR) and employment status (ES) emerged a
significant results about the interaction influence, which is to say that having a certain employment
status and having or not a bank loan in repayment play a role together in belonging to a RoSCA. Deeply
into details, the Tukey-Kramer post-hoc performed test isolated the level [employed] as the level where
the difference between means lies exactly. Concretely, employed people are the most susceptible to
get a bank loan when asking for it by means of their salary as a guarantee, and in some cases, these
borrowers find themselves forced to solicit other solutions to pay their monthly payment of bank credit
when financial difficulties occur and expenses increase. Then, a urgent plausible solution to solve this
problem is to join a RoSCA and collect the pool first (if lucky) to pay their financial commitments.
Being aware of what factors motivate the most a person to join this associations was not satisfactory
to conceptualize a new form of RoSCAs. This took us to go further into details with people having past
or actual experiences with this practice by asking them multiple questions on the operating procedures
of the joined RoSCA, and whether they tolerate or not some facts during the operation (entrance of a
new member for instance).
The following table summarizes answers of respondents in percentages :
12Plan d’épargne éducation (PEE) is a regulated tax-free saving plan proposed by many commercial banks in Morocco
to finance future students fees.
13The calculated F-stat is bigger than tabulated F corresponding to (9,713) degrees of freedom with an estimated
p-value equal to 0.024 lower than significance level of 0.05. We reject the null hypothesis and therefore, both IV have an
influence on the continuous dependent variable
14Note that no main effects were found for the educational level (EL) factor in all tests that include (EL) as a 1st or
a 2nd factor on Table 2.
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Table 3: Summary of Participants Demographics and Socioeconomic Data (part II)
Current/former member of a RoSCA (53.9%) Yes (46.1%) No
Number of members of
joined RoSCA*
<5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26 or more
(27.7%) (51.1%) (10.9%) (3.6%) (1.5%) (0.0%)
Contribution’s frequency*
Daily Weekly Monthly Other
(3.7%) (10.4%) (85.7%) (0.2%)
Subscription amount (in
MAD)*
<500 500-999 1000-1999 2000-2999 3000-3999 4000-4999 5000 or more
(32.6%) (24.2%) (28%) (8.3%) (3.8%) (1.5%) (1.5%)
Joining motivations*
Spontaneously Buy a home Buy durable
goods
Children
education
Vacation
travel
Pilgrimage Other
reasons
(35.3%) (8.9%) (22.5%) (9.3%) (18.9%) (2%) (3.1%)
Tolerate a new proposed entrance* (75.9%) Yes (24.1%) No
Order determining
criteria*
Drawing of
lots
Agreement of participants Social criteria (age,
sexe...)
Financial
criteria
Others
(26.2%) (41.8%) (6%) (21.3%) (4.7%)
Tolerate a urgent beneficiary* (91.9%) Yes (8.1%) No
RoSCA or low interest rate bank loan ? RoSCA (74.1%) Low interest rate bank loan (25.9%)
Respondents preferring
RoSCA are motivated by
Administrative
procedures
Interest free & no fees Religious conviction Other
reasons
(28.3%) (47.3%) (19.1%) (5.3%)
(*) Questions addressed to subjects affirming their current or previous participation to a RoSCA, the 53.9% who said yes.
Source: Authors own elaboration based on the survey’s results
The first important point to stress on this second part of results is the significant percentage of
subjects joining RoSCAs with 5 to 10 members (51.1% in this case). Moreover, only (1.5%) of the
respondents were (or actually are) participating in a RoSCA with more than 20 members which is
very marginal. This is basically related to level of confidence between members. The more the number
of participants increases, the more level of trust decreases. People select each other based on mutual
trust and genuine commitment to cooperative (Klonner and Rai, 2005), the small groups are found to
be more functional since groups members serve as guarantors for each other and have more ability to
create groups pressure between each other and enforce mutual loyalty.
Sure enough, most of associations allocate the pots monthly (85.7% of respondents contribute
monthly) while 10.4% of the subjects collect the pot on a weekly basis. This latter are generally people
with no fix jobs and low incomes who get their salary at the end of the week like most of informal
workers in Morocco. (Bouasria, 2013) investigated the practice of RoSCAs among Moroccan working
women more precisely and found very close results.
Surprisingly, the third (35.3%) of the respondents joined a RoSCA spontaneously as a simple easy
way to save money with no fees. This finding comfort us already about the ability of this financial
practice to drain more households savings once formalized and proposed by financing organization,
typically, an Islamic bank. An intuitive explanation of this is related to precautionary motives (one
of the Keynesian liquidity preference motives), people prefer to ensure liquidity for future social un-
expected problems that need unusual costs. During our field investigation where we addressed a good
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number of housewives, some of them stated that they generally participate to a RoSCA to save their
marginal incomes from immediate consumption claimed by their husbands. Note that this typical case
is largely present among Kennan housewives as observed by (Anderson and Baland, 2002).
For the remaining part of respondents, these are usually getting into a RoSCA for future acquisitions
and expenditures. Buying durable goods15 (as cars or furniture) and paying coming vacation expen-
ditures are the most motivating reasons to be a member of a RoSCA (22.5% and 18.9% respectively).
This is not surprising given the fact that Moroccan society is a consumer society where consumption
credits represent a significant part of granted loans (70.2 billion dirhams in 2015, nearly 6,41 billion
Euros). On another scale, some financially excluded poor people tend to purchase durable goods for
the simple reason to protect their savings from theft because of their restricted access to bank services,
which is reasonable too.
In consideration of accepting a new entrance proposal from an existing member, (75.9%) of respon-
dents mentioned that they would accept a new member to join them if this one is proposed by an
existing member. As long as trust is guaranteed and no violations will occur, existing members would
accept as much as possible new entrance without any restrictions16. We strongly relied on this fact in
conceptualizing the new formal type of RoSCA by making its mechanism more flexible for the entrance
of supplementary members and the departure of the existing one. This will, inter alia, keep the cycle
turning even in case of default of one of the members. Another advantage is to keep it open for all
members desiring to join a cycle corresponding to their preferences in terms of order, contribution’s
amount and frequency, etc.
Last but not least, when asking people whether they prefer to join a RoSCA or not even if they
have the possibility to contract a low interest rate bank loan, three-quarters (74.1%) of the subjects
responded favorably. Despite the presence of moral hazard and few guaranties in RoSCAs, most of
respondents affirmed that they would prefer it at the expense of bank loans for several reasons, and
the most important one is the absence of fees and interests (47.3%). The second reason determined
relies to administrative burden for getting a bank loan, which we initially expected. We know that the
banking coverage rate is at only 61% in Morocco and much people cannot access bank services for lack
of secure guaranties. At the same level, religious convictions regarding the prohibition of interest rate
in Islamic law, play also a substantial role in preferring RoSCAs instead of bank loans for the survey’s
subjects. We mention here that this practice was approved by both classical and contemporary Islamic
jurists, including the most conservative17.
3.2 The Bank-based investing RoSCA model
3.2.1 Mechanism of functioning
We propose on this section our baseline model of Bank-based investing RoSCAs (henceforth investing
RoSCA for short) which represents a new alternative of the classic type of RoSCAs practiced informally.
15This result supports the findings of (Besley et al., 1993) who studied the economic role of both random and bidding
RoSCAs and concluded their primarily use for the purchase of durable goods. The same finding was published by
(Gugerty, 2007) recently.
16This finding motivates us to wonder about the optimal (abusively, the maximal) number of members that a RoSCA
could hold with no impact on level of trust settled within the association.
17Dr. A. Al-Jibrin, studied and posted in Arabic at: http://www.mktaba.org/vb/showthread.php?t=13001 (accessed
October 16, 2015) a list of the positive opinions, ranging from neutral permissibility to positive approbation of credit
unions built on RoSCAs.
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Our proposition is intended to be an alternative for financing institutions (merrily, new Islamic finance
operators in Morocco) to drain more savings and reduce financial exclusion of a large proportion of
the population in respect of their convictions, on religious ground.
In fact, the model’s hybrid mechanism is based on the functioning of multiple financial instruments
combined together to give the participants both saving and investing opportunities. Unlike the classic
form of this associations, each member will have two opportunities, either getting an interest-free loan
or investing its savings and reap profits at the end of the operation. It is noteworthy that equity
between members and non inclusion of interest-based remuneration were highly taken into account in
the conceptualization of the model to fit with peoples preferences highlighted above on the survey’s
results, and therefore, gain ground among existing conventional financial products.
Schematically, the bank (which is the organizer of the operation, the guarantor and the main
investor as well) join the (n) participants in an associative relation to form an investing RoSCA. At
the beginning of each period Ti a pot is accumulated by members contributions including the bank
which makes a global amount (the pot) equal to C · (n + 1) where C is the individual contribution.
After that, the recipient has to choose between two options :
• The first one is to take-up the collected amount reduced by a temporary removal of a deposit for
latent default of payment. This deposit is calculated based on a risk score which depends on the
likelihood and severity of the default risk. At the end of the cycle, the whole deposit amount is
restored to the recipient ;
• The second option is to delegate the investment of the collected pot to the bank within the
remaining periods until the end of the cycle, and after that, the pot is returned to the recipient
plus its share of returns. ri is the Return On Investment (ROI) rate for the invested pool by the i-
th participant. If the investment is profitable, the returns are shared by both the participant and
the bank according to a predetermined percentages (pi and qi = 1 − pi respectively). However,
if any losses occur, they are borne only by the participant.
The table below traces the cash flows of each one of the members all along the cycle :
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Table 4: Cash flow statement for all participants including the bank
Bank Participant 1 Participant 2 . . . Participant (n-1) Participant n
Invest Take-up option Invest Take-up option Invest . . . Take-up option Invest Invest
T1 C·(n+1) −C −C . . . −C −C
T2 −C C ·(n+1)·(1−w1) −C −C . . . −C −C
T3 −C −C C ·(n+1)·(1−w2) −C . . . −C −C
..
.
..
.
..
.
..
.
..
.
..
.
..
.
..
.
..
.
Tn −C −C −C . . . C·(n+1)·(1−wn−1) −C −C
Tn+1 −C [C·(n+1)·w1]−C −C [C·(n+1)·w2]−C −C . . . [C·(n+1)·wn−1]−C −C C · (n + 1)
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1
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·(
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−
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−
1
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1
)
·(
1
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n
)
C = The amount of contribution. T1,2,...,n+1 are the periods (in months generally). rB = The Return On Investment (ROI) rate of the invested
pool C · (n + 1) by the bank at the first period. ri∈‖1;n‖ = The ROI rate for the invested pool by the i-th participant. wi∈‖1;n‖ = The guarantee
fee rate levied on the raised pool C · (n+ 1) as a deposit for default of the i-th participant. pi∈‖1;n‖ = Share of the i-th participant in its investment
returns while qi is the part of the bank, therefore pi + qi = 1.
Source: Authors own proposition
At the first period T1, as shown on the table, the bank has only one option to collect the pot
C · (n + 1) and invest it until the end of the operation. By doing so, this money will firstly serve as
a provision against any future risks, especially default of the members, and ensure liquidity18 for the
bank dedicated to investment from the beginning of the cycle. Secondly, the returns on investment of
this first pool should only benefit to the bank at 100% so it could at least recover the management
fees of the operation19. Aforementioned on the table by rB.
Additionally, at each time that one of the participants decides to invest its pool by means of the
bank, a pro rata percentage of overall returns should be awarded to the latter (qi). Thus, the capitalized
amount for the bank at the end of the cycle is given by :
[C · (n+ 1) · [(1 + rB) +
∑n
i=1 riqi]
As for the other participants, each one of them in turn (except the n-th participant) is being offered
two possibilities :
18Since new Islamic finance operators in Morocco cannot access the existing inter-bank lending market because of
interest rates, they technically, run higher short term liquidity risk comparing to conventional banks as long as an
Islamic inter-bank money market has not been established yet. This proposed model of investing RoSCAs offers a
significant advantage for this new operators in terms of ensuring immediate liquidity.
19The challenging advantage here is that participant will have no application or management fees to pay for joining
the investing RoSCA. This is very motivating when we know that 24% of unbanked Moroccans cite high costs as the
main reason for not having a bank account (reported in 2014 by the World Bank on a survey they conducted in Morocco
about financial inclusion and Capability).
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• The first one consists in collecting the pool reduced by the deposit amount C ·wi · (n+1) where
wi is the guarantee fee rate levied on the raised pool C · (n+1). This deposit is recovered at the
last period Tn+1. Subsequently, the recipient capitalizes at the end of the cycle a global amount
only equivalent to the individual contribution multiplied by the number of periods C · (n + 1).
We call it here the neutral position.
• On the other side, the second option offered is to consign the pot to the bank which invest it and
pay back the recipient a capital of C · (n + 1) · (1 + ripi) when the cycle is complete. ri is the
ROI rate for the pool invested by participant i and pi is its share in these returns. We talk here
about the risky position. It’s noteworthy to mention that this second option of investing offered
to participants is based on the concept of "Mudaraba"20 found in Islamic finance and one of the
pillars of Islamic banking.
After all, the participant n (the last one) will be offered only one option that consists in getting the
pot at the end of the cycle plus its investment returns corresponding to one period Tn (the last month
of the operation for instance), with a corresponding ROI rate of rn. Generally, it is a person who does
have no intention to take up the pool during the whole operation.
Since returns are supposed to be higher as long as the period of investment is longer, investing
the pool at T1 is more likely to be profitable than its investing at the last period Tn. Consequently,
assuming that percentages of returns pi of each participant are equal, this will led to assign higher
profits (losses eventually) for the first beneficiaries.
In order to ensure equity between all the members, these have to be given the same investment
opportunity all along the cycle, which supposes to attribute increasing percentages pi as long as the
cycle comes to its end to balance the situation. Explicitly :
∀i ∈ ‖2;n‖, 0 < pi−1 < pi < 1 and 0 < qi < qi−1 < 1
Where ∀i ∈ ‖1;n‖, pi + qi = 1
The challenging issue here is that the return on investment rate is not fixed beforehand as for
interest rate known initially, and could be either positive or negative. Participants have to wait until
the end of the cycle to observe their returns just like in the profit-loss sharing contract Mudaraba
in Islamic finance. This makes the proposed model completely Shariah-compliant because both sides
share profits and losses, which is the real essence of Islamic finance.
In addition, note that this mechanism encourages investing actions all along the procedure by giving
the participants the possibility to invest at each period in parallel with the option to take up the pot for
consumption. Real economy is more promoted by this Model of RoSCA comparing to the traditional
ones and so many other informal financing practices. This is why we chose to name it "Investing
RoSCA".
20In Mudaraba, the capitalist (rabb al-mal) entrusts his capital (raa’s al-mal) to an agent (’amil or mudarib), to be
managed and employed in generally determined trade operations. The agent agrees to return the capital when the
transaction is complete, along with whatever profit had been agreed upon, while keeping the remaining amount of profit
as compensation for his work. The financial risk is entirely assumed by the capitalist, while the agent is not charged
with any refund in case the deal fails for a cause not attributable to him (Khan and Porzio, 2010).
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3.2.2 Risk score evaluation
What if RoSCAs were gathering people who do not know each other? in other words, should people
rely only on their social capital to form these associations?. This question led us straightforward to
take into account anonymity between members in the conceptualization of this model, and this for
several reasons.
First of all, people wishing to form a RoSCA at a certain moment might not be able to gather
a sufficient number of acquaintances for several considerations. And even though, these latter are
not supposed to have the same plan of contribution in terms of capacity or frequency while other
"unknown" people are. The challenging issue here is about making these associations permissible to
people with no social or professional links.
Introducing the bank as a member of the investing RoSCA is of primary importance. Besides
organizing the operation and investing for the participants and for its own account, the bank serves
mainly as a guarantor toward all participants in case of default of one them.
Indeed, the bank is the first one to take-up the collected amount serving as a provision for default
risk, and additionally, serving to cover the management fees of the operation through its returns of
investment.
A second safety measure is that, once one of the members decides to take-up the amount, a deposit
is levied according to a certain guarantee fee rate wi. This one is calculated depending on two factors
: the likelihood of default and its severity (impact of default of one of the members on the progress of
the operation).
In the worst case-scenario of failure of one of the members, the bank takes over and acts in his place
in terms of rights and obligations. This procedure makes the "wheel" continuously turning without
any compromise to the flow of the operation. Therefore, this makes the investing RoSCA model more
sustainable comparing to the other types of RoSCAs (random and bidding RoSCAs for instance).
As noted above, the guarantee fee rate wi is function of two factors, namely, the likelihood of the
default risk and its impact or severity on the progress of the operation. Hereafter, we present the
risk-rating matrix we elaborated for the determination of the guarantee fee rate wi.
Table 5: Risk Rating Matrix (Risk score = likelihood × Severity)
Likelihood
Improbable Remote Occasional Probable Frequent
0 ≤ ρi ≤ 0.2 0.21 ≤ ρi ≤ 0.4 0.41 ≤ ρi ≤ 0.6 0.61 ≤ ρi ≤ 0.8 0.8 ≤ ρi ≤ 1
S
ev
er
it
y
Very high impact T2 1 ρi
...
...
...
T3
n−1
n ρi · n−1n
... ... ...
Tn−1 2n
2ρi
n
Very low impact Tn 1n
ρi
n
n = Number of participants. Ti∈‖2;n‖ are the periods given that participants cannot take the pot until the second period T2. ρi = The estimated
probability of default of the i-th participant.
Source: Proposed by the authors based on the credit risk rating method (Anthony Tony Cox, 2008).
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The risk rating method is used in several areas like banking, information systems management,
and security... where risks are existing and should be evaluated. This method calculates a score by
multiplying the scale points of likelihood of risk occurrence by the scale points of its severity. Generally,
the likelihood and severity factors are being attributed scale-points ranging from 1 to 5, hence, the
scores range from 1 to 25. In our case, we adopted a different type of scales for both factors where the
product of their multiplication is a weighted score to the guarantee fee rate wi.
For the first factor of likelihood, there are five categories that represent the estimated probability
of default ρi of the i-th participant. On the other side of the matrix, the severity factor contains scale
points as much as the number of periods T2 to Tn. Periods T1 and Tn+1 are, simply, not included here
because the bank and the n-th participant are not concerned by the guarantee fee since they do not
have the option to take-up the pool.
The scale points of the second factor of severity express how impacting is the default of one of
the members at each period. Practically, the default of one of the members at period T2 has more
consequences on the progress of the Investing RoSCA compared to the default of one of them at Tn.
This is why severity is decreasing from very high impact to very low impact as long as the time passes.
The scale points calculation is given by the following formula :
Severity scale point = number of periods until the end of the cyclen
Concretely, if the participant takes-up the pot at period T2, he will be forced to contribute within n
periods until the end of the cycle to honor his commitments, hence, the scale point is equal to nn = 1.
For the last taker, he will have only one period left to the end of the cycle which gives a scale point
equal to 1n . The table above gives the product (Risk scores) of both factors scale points as well.
These scores represent the weighting factors used to determine the guarantee fee rates wi, where :
∀i ∈ ‖1;n− 1‖, wi = f(risk score)
Assuming that participants have the same probabilities of default ρi, the guarantee fee rate wi will
be decreasing as much as the end of the cycle is closer allowing the raised amount to be more significant.
The risk score is here diluted by time. That said, it is important to mention that this scoring approach
relies also on the fair estimation of default risk probabilities ρi of each one of the members.
When it comes to predict the future and estimate probabilities of default, the most reliable way
is to review the past. In the micro finance and banking sectors, data such us credit reports and
salary history help lenders to make fair predictions on a larger scale and in an increasingly automated
way in their procedure of credit approval. The banks credit-scoring approaches typically assess three
characteristics (Baer et al., 2012) :
• Identity, to reduce fraud ;
• Ability to repay, based on income and current debt load ;
• Willingness to repay, usually based on past credit performance21.
These methods are less effective in emerging economies, and especially among unbanked lower-
income segments. Because lower-income customers often have no access to formal financing, there
21These information are generally provided by specialized institutions such as "La centrale des risques" in Morocco,
These institutions collect, centralize, and communicate information on credits and micro loans granted by banks and
micro credit institutions to specific inquiries from financing institutions.
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is no record of past borrowing behavior. Debt capacity is hard to judge because most lower-income
workers are often paid wages in cash and have little or no formal savings or registered assets that could
be used as collateral (Baer et al., 2012).
The issue is that when, it is about an unbanked lower-income desiring to join an investing RoSCA,
the information required to estimate default probability of applicants might not be satisfactory. In
general, as like in micro-finance sector, a field investigation is performed to get a bigger picture of risk
by collecting more information about the applicant.
For our present model, as a complementary measure to take into account in the default evaluation,
we propose to adopt a "grading system" for applicants who know already each other and wish to form
an investing RoSCA in a body. Practically, each one of the group will be called to rank his associates
"anonymously" by default likelihood, and hence, the bank will get already an additional insight into
solvency and default probability of each one of them. We estimate that the best information about an
applicant comes from his associates, because they are the most affected by his default that impacts
the progress of the operation. This concerns only the applicants who desire to opt for the group frame.
But in general, the model is designed so the participants could join with no prior cognition.
4 Concluding remarks
This study has presented some econometric evidence on the economics of rotating savings and credit
associations in Morocco. The first results pertain to the socioeconomic characteristics interacting
mutually to motivate a person to join a RoSCA. These are four in number, marital and employment
status, educational level, and having a bank loan in repayment.
By using the two-way ANOVA, we found that these variables interact jointly one-to-another, and
with other variables to motivate a person to join a RoSCA. But we suppose that, it will be interesting
in our shortcoming works, to incorporate further independent variables, such as salary, to explain the
motivating reasons for joining a RoSCA as well as periodicity and amount of contribution, and number
of contributors. This by using a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA).
The second part of the survey’s answers provides insights into the functioning of RoSCAs in Mo-
rocco and members preferences in terms of participation plan (contribution amount, frequency, order
determination, etc.). The answers gave us, also, a basis to the conceptualization of a new model of
RoSCA that fits with people’s religious convictions, preferences and conditions.
The designed model introduces the bank as an associate member to the participants and gives
them both possibilities of collecting their pots in turn or investing instead. It is important to mention
that all participants, including the bank, derive substantial benefits through this procedure. The
bank gets hold of immediate liquidity, which represents for Islamic banks an additional alternative
to compensate their restrained access to conventional inter-bank market. As for the participants, the
financially excluded ones get the possibility to access free of charges formal financing in an associative
form with no consistent collateral.
This model is found to be more equitable and sustainable compared to other types of RoSCAs
on different scales. In an investing scenario, participants who decide to invest are being offered a
balanced final capital (given a common offered return on investment (ROI) rate). This makes the
order insignificant, at least if there are no urgent needs to raise funds first.
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The bank acts as a guarantor for any anticipated default risk. This through the set up of several
measures. By doing so, people could make part of these savings and credit associations with no
necessary prior cognition. This is very engaging, especially for applicants with no extended social
capital in which they can rely to do it separately. One of these measures is the temporarily levy of a
deposit for default.
The paper provides also, a risk rating matrix to evaluate the default risk of participants depending
on its likelihood and its impact on the progress of the operation. We proposed, as well, to opt for a
"grading system" of the likelihood of the default risk to be operated by the socially linked applicants.
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